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Although directed to the British system of Town and Country Planning this paper has 
relevance for many OECD countries, including some with systems of land use regulation 
which evolved entirely independently of the British. The paper starts by characterising the 
basic features of the British land use planning system, viewed from the resource allocation 
point of view of an economist. A conclusion is that the system explicitly excludes any use of 
price signals from its decisions. The paper then summarises the problems which the exclusion 
of price information has given rise to. Because the UK planning system has deliberately 
constrained the supply of space, and space is an attribute of housing which is income elastic in 
demand, rising incomes not only drive rising real house prices but also mean that land prices 
have risen considerably faster than house prices. Several housing attributes other than garden 
space are to a degree substitutes for land but the underlying cause of the inelastic supply of 
housing in the UK is the constraint on land supply. The final section proposes a mechanism 
which would make use of the information embodied in the price premiums of neighbouring 
parcels of land zoned for different uses. Such premiums signal the relative scarcity of land for 
different uses at each location and should become a ‘material consideration’ in planning 
decision-making. If they were above some threshold, this should provide a presumption of 
development unless maintaining the land in its current use could be shown to be in the public 
interest. If combined with Impact Fees, such a change would not only make housing supply 
more elastic and the system more transparent but would help to distance land availability 
decisions from the political process. 
 







The setting up of the Barker Enquiry in 2003
1 signalled not the end of an era but the 
beginning of the end of an era.  Land use planning is about the allocation of a scarce resource 
to different uses but historically it has operated in a specialised arena of its own. As is argued 
below, the system explicitly excludes price information. Yet it has fundamental implications 
for both prices and, in wider terms, for economic competitiveness. Again, as is shown below, 
the effects on prices are incremental over time. Historically they have not been such as to 
attract the attention of mainstream economists or economic policy makers: until now. Now 
the impact on housing markets, and even on wider issues of macroeconomic policy and 
savings behaviour, has escalated to the point where land use planning has got onto the agenda 
of economic policy makers and finance ministers. This is not just the case in Britain. It is also 
true in the US: the June 2003 issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic 
Policy Review was entirely devoted to the economic impacts of land use regulation.  Planners 
have to adjust to a world in which the economic as well as the planning logic of what they do 
is not just analysed but is central to their concerns. This paper suggests a way in which price 
information could be effectively introduced into planning decision making while leaving the 
environmentally and the socially valuable functions of planning intact. 
 
The basic structure of land use planning in Britain was introduced in the 1947 Town & 
Country Planning Act. Although it has been amended and modified since then, it has 
remained unchanged both in terms of its fundamental aims and mechanisms. It is almost 
certainly the least changed feature of the sweeping changes introduced by the 1945 Attlee 
government. Its main aims were encapsulated in The Containment of Urban England (Hall et 
al., 1973).  These were to: define urban envelopes outside which development would not be 
permitted; maintain open space both internally within built up areas but more particularly in 
Green Belts and other less stringently protected swathes of agricultural land surrounding 
urban areas; to promote orderly development; protect visual amenities; and prevent 
development in designated areas of countryside of special scenic importance
2. Although the 
proposals outlined in this paper are focused on the British context, since systems based on the 
1947 British system of Town and Country Planning were subsequently implemented in many 
                                                 
1 Established by Gordon Brown in his Budget speech: the enquiry was into the operation of the British housing 
market. Its remit specifically related to the potential impact of land use planning on housing supply and the 
instability of the British housing market. The review produced two reports (Barker, 2003 & 2004). The Interim 
report provided a great deal of valuable evidence on housing supply and its relation to land availability as well as 
an analysis of the workings of the planning system. The Final report’s recommendations were drawn within the 
framework of the existing planning system and proposed a stronger regional perspective and the introduction of 
housing affordability criteria in drawing up land release plans. The proposals required significant further work to 
be implemented, however, and tended to move in the direction of a master plan based system. It was recognised 
that solving problems created by regulation by the introduction of further regulations was a difficult task and that 
the speed of change would need to be strategically reviewed within a few years. In fact, the general election 
expected in 2005 put serious action on hold. 
2 This is intentionally a simplified summary omitting some elements which were much discussed at the time 
(such as ‘betterment’ and development by the State) in order to focus on essential elements which have 
remained. In addition, the discussion below, in relation to the differences between the British system where the 
emphasis is on flexible development control in contrast to other systems which rely on the certainty of a zoning 
system, overstates the contrast. 
2 other countries, the arguments made here have relevance far beyond Britain. Indeed with 
changes in the US and the growing application of growth boundaries to communities there, 
they have increasing relevance to systems of land use regulation not derived from the British 
experience.  
 
The process and procedures set up to make decisions within the new 1947 planning system 
were defined in purely administrative, legal and physical terms. Judgements as to whether 
development would reduce amenities or cause transport problems were on the basis of 
professional norms which were defined in physical terms but the parameters of which rested 
on purely subjective and/or aesthetic values. The system was developed on the basis of 
concepts such as 'housing need' (rather than demand), and on design norms with, for example, 
densities defined on physical criteria – so many dwellings per acre. Concepts such as 'visual 
amenity' had - and continue to have - an important role but were subjectively defined. 
Although in determining how much land to designate for housing development, population 
change and migration were allowed for, these were not and are not modelled or conceived of 
in ways that have become commonplace in labour economists’ studies of migration in which 
real labour market opportunities, differential house prices and, more recently, quality of life 
and local public goods (Gyourko & Tracy, 1991) played an important role; rather, they were 
modelled mechanically from supposed givens such as employment or 'land availability'. 
Similarly the driving force behind changes in 'housing need' (which were translated into 
changes in land availability via constant physical densities) in a locality was seen as changes 
in household numbers not changes in real incomes or relative prices that would affect the 
amounts of housing demanded. 
 
The whole planning system has thus grown up without any account being taken of price 
information or other economic indicators. The system decides the physical quantity of land to 
be made available for any given use but market forces then allocate such land to competing 
bidders. Moreover, no account is taken of the possibility that the most profitable use of land 
may be to leave it undeveloped to maintain the option of later development (Titman, 1985, 
Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). Land which has been made available for housing (or any other 
specified use) is deemed to be a part of land supply even though the owners of the land may 
rationally choose to keep such land vacant. This leads to a situation in which planners 
rationally decide that there is sufficient land available for housing (for example) because 
projections of household numbers at permitted densities can be accommodated on the land 
which has been designated but the available land is not developed either because the owners 
of designated land have objective functions which include other factors than direct monetary 
returns or – more probably given the pattern of land prices that has resulted from the 
constraints imposed on land supply – choose to keep the land vacant to retain the option of 
more profitable development at a later date. 
 
A further feature of the British planning system is that it rests on the process of 'development 
control'. Development is legally defined so that it is a right separated from freehold tenure of 
land. Development is defined to mean any change of designated use. This means that freehold 
tenure does not include rights to change the use of land. Uses are themselves legally defined 
so that the supply of land for each legally defined use is separately controlled by the planning 
system. Thus land which is designated for agricultural use cannot be converted to housing use 
without specific planning permission from the planning authority; but nor can a newspaper 
shop be converted into a betting shop or an estate agents without planning permission; nor an 
industrial building into offices or into housing.  
 
3 It is worth highlighting two aspects of this system which are peculiar to Britain (and to 
planning systems modelled on the 1947 Act elsewhere in the world). The first is the specific 
separation of ownership from development rights and the particular legal definition of what 
constitutes development. The second is the process of Development Control whereby 
permission has to be individually obtained for any change of use defined as development. 
This is in distinction to planning systems which use Zoning (as in the US) or a 'Master Plan' 
(applied in most of continental Europe) in which if a form of development is within the rules 
applying to that parcel of land then it can automatically be undertaken so long as it conforms 
to the plan and to other local regulations (such as safety or building regulations). 
 




As is shown in section 2 below, the allocation of land supply for each urban purpose by fiat 
quite independently of price has resulted over time in the emergence of very substantial price 
discontinuities for adjoining parcels of land. This is because although the total supply of land 
for each category of use in each locality is allocated independently of price, the market then 
allocates the determined supply of land for each use through the price mechanism to 
competing occupiers or developers. These price discontinuities, therefore, reflect the current 
expected degree of supply constraint on land for each type of planned use in each locality. So 
they provide a flexible price signal which will vary both over time and between cities yielding 
information about the relative scarcity of land for specific uses at that particular location and 
time. Land value discontinuities induced by development controls were explicitly considered 
in a static urban model in Sheppard (1988). Other factors can also result in discontinuities, 
such as the dynamic considerations introduced by Capozza and Helsley (1989; 1990). A 
stylised example, abstracting from these complexities, is illustrated in Fig 1. Fig 1a shows the 
4 zones determined at some date soon after 1947 accommodating three land uses – commercial, 
industrial and residential. At the containment boundary there was a discontinuity between the 
prices of agricultural land and land serviced for residential development because of the 
infrastructure costs embodied in the value of serviced land. Fig 1b illustrates the position as it 
evolved over time. As incomes rose and the structure of the local economy changed, the 
demand for commercial and for residential land rose relative to that for industrial and 
agricultural land. For the purpose of simplicity and exposition, it is assumed the zones of each 
land use did not change to accommodate these changes in demand. The prices of land for 
commercial and residential use were consequently bid up leading to the emergence of 
discontinuities in the land values of adjoining parcels in different use zones. 
 
2. The economic background 
a) housing and land markets 
Over the past 35 years, there has been an increasing body of economic literature applying 
hedonic analysis to the housing market. The theoretical basis of this literature was provided in 
Rosen (1974) although as an empirical technique hedonic analysis precedes Rosen by more 
than 45 years. The basic idea is to conceive of complex goods such as houses as being 
composed of a bundle of attributes each of which commands a price that can be estimated and 
for each of which a conceptual and, in principle, identifiable market exists with its own supply 
and demand characteristics. In the case of housing the most important categories of attributes 
are those that relate to the physical structure (such as space, number of rooms, specification or 
design) and those that relate to its location (such as the character of the neighbourhood, the 
access it provides to the centre of employment, the quality of local schools or access to 
locationally fixed environmental amenities). For a recent literature survey and summary of 
progress in the hedonic study of housing and housing markets see Sheppard (1999).  
 
There have now been hundreds, perhaps thousands, of hedonic studies of housing markets 
undertaken around the world and no credible study has been done which has not found a 
strong and significant attribute price for internal space within the house. Far fewer studies 
have been done which include garden space
3 but those which have been done similarly find 
that garden space itself is an attribute which commands a price. Findings of studies such as 
that by Song and Knaap (2003) that there is, other things equal, a price discount for houses in 
higher density neighbourhoods are essentially the flip side of the same coin. Table 1 shows a 
selection of attribute prices, and changes in them, estimated for the Reading area, a 
prosperous housing market about 60 kms west of London, at two different dates, 1984 and 
1993. 
 
Both 1984 and 1993 represented periods of relative stability in house prices but 1993 was a 
low point following the collapse of the housing market boom after 1989. In 1993, compared 
to a 50 year average, house prices relative to earnings were close to a low – nationally the 
house price to earnings ratio fell 20 percent between 1984 and 1993 only to rise in the decade 
following 1993 by about 60 percent
4. This probably accounts for the greater proportionate 
                                                 
3 Since economic theory tells one that the price of housing land will vary systematically with distance from 
employment centres it is not possible to estimate the price of garden space without also including the exact 
location of the house with respect to the centre(s) of employment. This also means that in any urban area there is 
not one price of land but a price function with respect to distance/location. It is consequently far more 
demanding to estimate the price of garden space in terms of both data requirements and estimation techniques. 
 
4 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/DatasetType.asp?vlnk=392 for the earnings index and using the 
Nationwide House Price Index. 
 
5 increase in incomes than in house prices between 1984 and 1993 in the Reading market. 
However, since here we are interested in the change in attribute prices relative to each other 
the cyclical movement of the housing market overall is not of major concern. 
 
Table 1 : Changes in prices of selected attributes: Reading housing market, 1984-93 
  1984  1993  % Change 
 
Income (pre-tax)       
from sample £13,694  £28,969  111.5 
South East (Regional Trends)  £12,896  £22,027  70.8 
       
Price Level (1987=100)  91.0  141.9  55.9 
       
Sample mean house price  £51,066  £94,990  86.0 
       
Reproducible attributes       
Central heating £4,954  £5,997  21.1 
Bedrooms £2,599  £2,801  7.8 
Bathrooms + WC £4,687  £6,229  32.9 
     
Planning amenities       
Less industrial land £74  £224  202.7 
More open accessible land £51  £227  345.1 
More closed unbuilt land
1 £102  £60  - 41.2 
     
Space (price per m
2)       








at periphery £4.5  £22.9  404.9 
median distance £12.8  £32.1  151.5 
Internal floorspace  £171  £425  148.5 
       
Local Public Goods       
Best secondary school
2 £7,090  £13,414  89.2 
1Mainly agricultural land to which there are no significant rights of public access. 
2 An estimate from data for 
1999-2000 shows this price to have risen to £23,763. 
Source:
  Reproduced from Cheshire and Sheppard 2004 
 
It is immediately apparent that prices for attributes whose supply is relatively elastic, provided 
through a market process and produced by industrial means (such as central heating or simple 
changes to construction/design such as the number of bedrooms) fell in real terms between 
1984 and 1993. In contrast, the price of those attributes not provided through markets but via 
fiat through the planning system, rose substantially in real terms. Not only that, but the price 
of garden space rose proportionately most where the supply was most constrained by the 
planning system: that is at the edge of the urban area where the containment policy was felt 
most strongly. Garden space nearer to the centre, although it cost more per square metre in 
absolute terms, increased in price proportionately less. The price of local public goods 
effectively bought through the housing market, such as access to the best secondary school, 
rose more or less in line with incomes. This is consistent with most of the costs of private 
schooling of similar quality - an obvious substitute - taking the form of labour costs. 
 
6 The reason for this pattern of price changes over time for specific attributes is the interaction 
of changes in the demand for, and supply of them. Evidence on the demand characteristics for 
individual housing attributes is relatively scarce but in a British context can be gleaned from 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) and Cheshire et al (1999). These estimates suggest that the 
demand for space was strongly income elastic. This was true both for internal and garden 
space. It was true across the three cities and for each period estimates were derived for: 
Darlington in 1984 and 1997, Nottingham in 1997 and Reading in 1984 and 1993. Not only 
was the income elasticity of demand for space strong but there was considerable stability in 
the estimates over time and across housing markets. Evaluated at median observed incomes, 
the values varied from a low of 1.6 for internal space in Reading in 1984 to a high of 3.8 for 
garden space in Darlington in the same year. Four of the five estimates for the income 
elasticity of demand for garden space were higher than the corresponding estimates for 
internal space and the mean value of the income elasticity of demand for garden space was 2.4 
compared to 2.0 for internal space. The evidence strongly suggests (the not surprising 
conclusion) that the demand for housing space - both internal and external - is normal with 
consumers seeking to buy more space as their incomes increase.  
 
There seems, therefore, to be evidence supporting the conclusion that by restricting the supply 
of urban space in the face of rising real incomes and a normal income elasticity of demand for 
space – the operation of the planning system, especially in areas of high income growth such 
as Reading - has caused the price of space to rise significantly. If this is correct then a further 
implication is that over time the price of housing land should have risen in real terms more 
rapidly than the price of houses. This is because houses are composite goods and there is 
substitutability between attributes. If land becomes more expensive then more floors can be 
substituted for a larger floor plan, terraced or semi-detached houses can be substituted for 
detached houses or perhaps public open space can be substituted for garden space. Equally, 
more but smaller rooms with design features such as built-in storage can be substituted for 
larger rooms. So over time, if land prices rise as a result of a constraint on supply, design, 
densities and construction techniques are likely to adapt to substitute cheaper for more 
expensive attributes with the result that house prices rise less than land prices. Such a result is 
made even more likely if the apparent higher value of income elasticity of demand for garden 
space compared to internal space is supported by other evidence. 
 
There is in fact other evidence suggesting a higher income elasticity of demand for garden 
space. Although the focus of debate has been on the housing market, it is shown in Cheshire 
and Sheppard (2004) that over the long period the increase in land values (times a factor of 11 
in real terms since 1955) greatly exceeded that of house prices (times a factor of 3.5 over the 
same period). Moreover, if there is an increasingly tight constraint on the supply of space one 
would expect an increasing degree of price volatility in the market. Adjustment to short run 
changes in demand has been increasingly through changes in price rather than quantity. This, 
too, is observed. The amplitude of the cycle increased from the mid 1950s and is very much 
greater for land than it is for house prices. The evidence thus supports the view that the 
planning system constrains the supply of space (rather than the supply of houses) but space is 
an attribute not only demanded but one which is also highly income elastic in demand. 
 
b) Discontinuities in the land value surface 
A further implication of this analysis is that the operation of the planning system in areas of 
demand growth (effectively all of the UK since demand is chiefly dependent on growth in real 
incomes – although with differential growth in the south east of England) would generate 
substantial discontinuities in land values over short geographical distances. This was 
illustrated in Fig 1 and results from the feature of the system discussed above: that it controls 
7 the supply of land for each category of use, individually, and independently of price. Thus if 
housing land is kept in short supply relative to market demand, its price at the urban fringe 
will rise above the combined value of land for agriculture and the infrastructure costs 
associated with converting it to housing. Similarly, if land for any other designated use is 
constrained relative to demand for it to a greater degree than the constraint imposed on the 
supply of land for use in the adjoining zone, then its price will be bid up above that of land in 
the neighbouring zone but designated for some other use. 
 
Observing such discontinuities is relatively easy at the urban fringe because the supply of 
agricultural land is not constrained by the planning system, so in high demand areas the 
discontinuity is large. Moreover, since housing is the dominant use of urban land, there is 
relatively good information on housing land prices at various locations. Table 2 shows 
estimates of land values in the Reading area for a range of separate uses at a given date – 
1984. These estimates were prepared for a study on the economic effects of the planning 
system undertaken between 1983 and 1986 and were reported in Cheshire and Sheppard 
(1986). Healey and Baker estimated the non-housing land values while the housing land 
values represent the range reported by local estate agents.  The Zones refer to zones of 
constant
5 value within the total area set by the planning system for each use. The higher value 
zones within each land use category tended to be nearer to the centre of the city. Some early 
estimates of the housing market impacts were published in Cheshire and Sheppard (1989). 
 
Table 2 : Reading Urban Land Prices: 1984 
Land Use  £ 000’s per acre Current  £ 000’s per acre 2002 prices 
Office use     
Zone 1  7 964-13 241
1  15 748-26 183 
Zone 2  3 806-8 370
1  7 526-16 551 
Zone 3  2 621-5 103
1  
Zone 4  602-1 308
1  1 190-2 586 
Retail    
Zone 1a  28 779-34 151
2 56908-67  531 
Zone 1b  24 467-27 818
2  48 382-55 008 
Zone 2  12 807-15 794
2  25 325-31 231 
Zone 3  9 786-12 458
2  19 351-24 635 
Zone 4  8 941  17 680 
Zone 5  3 020-3 927
2  5 972-7 765 
Zone 6  5 688   
Zone 7  2 539  5 021 
Industrial    
Zone 1  400*  791 
Zone 2  500*  989 
Zone 3  450*  890 
Residential    
Edge of existing urban area  120-205  237-405 
    
Source: Cheshire and Sheppard (1986) 
*Estimated variance ± 5% 
1 Range of observations  
2 Range of estimates varying with exact location and floor plan size/access/permitted structure type 
 
                                                 
5 More precisely values which could not be reliably separated. 
8 At the time of the study, agricultural land values at the urban fringe (stripped of 'hope' value) 
were – as now - about £2,500 per acre and infrastructure costs were reported as being from 
£25,000 to £50,000 per acre at 1983 prices. It can be seen therefore that there was a net 
premium for residential land at the urban fringe of from £70,000 to £180,000 per acre
6. 
However there was also a premium for industrial land adjoining residential zones, for 
neighbourhood retail land internal to residential or adjoining industrial zones and for land for 
office use adjoining inner areas zoned for either residential or retail use. The highest priced 
land of all, however, was for prime retail sites in the main shopping streets in the town centre. 
Nevertheless, at each border the premium was very substantial: at the residential-industrial 
border it was more than £200,000 per acre and at the industrial-retail border more than 
£2,000,000 per acre. All these figures are at 1984 prices. The third column of the table 
converts these to 2002 prices simply using the Retail Price Index (RPI). 
 
Table 3 : Some Residential Land Sales 1999-2002: Reading Area 
Source: Campbell Gordon, Reading 
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19.58 2.00  105 
Houses 
Oct 2001  3000 
                                                 
6 An important point to note is that these reported prices are for a quasi market price of land incorporating the 
capitalised value of all the amenities, expected neighbourhood characteristics and local public goods such as 
schools. Market prices are to be distinguished from the concept of ‘land price’ as analysed in the classic 
monocentric urban model of Alonso, Muth or Mills which refers to the price of land as ‘pure-space-with-
accessibility-to-the-employment-centre’. This will typically be significantly lower. In the case of Reading, it was 
estimated for 1984 as being from around £20,000 at the urban fringe rising to just over £200,000 per acre at the 
centre. 
9 Since about 1965, the economy of the Reading area has become increasingly specialised in 
the hi-tech and finance sectors. The sharp downturn that took place following 2000-01 has 
produced a new situation. Demand for housing appeared still to be very high but prices 
developers were paying for sites zoned for industrial use had fallen sharply. Prices reported 
for a selection of parcels of residential land in the Reading area between 1999 and 2001 are 
shown in Table 3. As can be seen these remained very high, reaching £4 million per acre early 
in 2001. Later that year they appeared to have fallen back somewhat but the price reported for 
a 1.5 acre site on the southeastern fringe of the urban area in August 2003 was expected to be 
some £3 million per acre
7. This was for a site then designated for industrial development, 
however, so the premium appeared to have gone the other way compared to 1984. There was 
still a discontinuity in the price surface but with residential land commanding a significant 
premium at the residential-industrial zone border because of the sharp fall in interest for 
industrial development. 
 
3. Introducing price signals 
This observation provides a potential means of introducing price information into the system 
of planning decision-making in a politically neutral and quasi-objective way. At present local 
planning authorities, in determining their decisions, exclude all factors which are not defined 
as 'material' to the case to be decided. Factors constituting such 'material considerations' are 
defined within the planning legislation and are taken into account since, if they are not, the 
decision of the planning authority is liable to be overturned on appeal. Nevertheless, planning 
authorities are quasi-political bodies and since they are very local – Districts – they are under 
pressure from local interests. Local interests are highly asymmetric to reflect those who suffer 
the costs of development rather than the interests of those who may benefit
8 (many of whom 
are located outside the District and therefore not regarded as part of the constituency of the 
local authority). 
 
The planning system is designed to generate amenity benefits and it can be shown that it does 
(see for example, Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; or Song and 
Knaap, 2003). Open space and the separation of industrial from residential development are 
valued. The problem is that given the constraints on land supply that have been entailed in 
generating these benefits it seems that – at least in areas of high demand – there is a 
substantial, sometimes serious, net welfare loss associated with producing them generated by 
the increased costs of housing space. Householders in areas such as Reading would be 
significantly better off if constraints on land supply were relaxed despite the reduction in 
planning generated amenities such a relaxation would entail (see Cheshire and Sheppard 
2002). This is of course looking at the costs and benefits in terms of equivalent flows of 
income needed to generate observed or estimated welfare levels. Supply constraints and the 
amenities planning produces also generate asset values (as analysed, for example, by Fischel 
2001) which substantially redistribute wealth to house owners from renters and to older 
households compared to younger ones. 
                                                 
7Conversation with Ian Campbell FRICS of Campbell Gordon 22 8 2003: price quoted for land on the 
Wokingham/Bracknell border then zoned for industrial - if re-zoned for residential. 
8 There is an endemic problem in the planning process of internalising externalities. The cost of new residential 
development, for example, will include disruption during construction plus loss of amenities for existing 
residents if, for example, they lose views or access to open space. These are not just losses of amenities but 
financial losses too since these values are capitalised into house prices. As Fischel (2001) argued, the fact that 
houses are non-liquid, immobile but major components of most individuals’ asset structures makes the defence 
of their value very important. Benefits from development will be widely spread in slightly lower regional house 
prices and a more competitive regional economy. In some cases (Terminal 5 at Heathrow might be an example) 
benefits are spread geographically even wider than the sub region or region. 
10  
The suggestion here is that the premium in land prices for one use over another at zone 
borders should formally constitute a material consideration which planning authorities would 
be required to take into account in determining development decisions. If the premium 
exceeded some specified threshold then there should be a presumption that development 
permission would be granted unless, and only unless, it could be shown that the excess 
premium reflected amenity, environmental or economic values generated by retaining the land 
in its current use; and that these amenity values were equal to or exceeded the current 
premium. If this were the case then it would be deemed that the current use of the land was in 
the public interest. 
 
To implement such a change would require three problems to be solved. The first would be to 
provide a neutral mechanism for estimating current land values in any given use. Two 
methods suggest themselves. The Valuation Office through the district valuers already 
provides a service along these lines. Selective results are reported twice a year in their 
Property Market Report but in fact estimates are produced for all Districts. An alternative 
might be to require the would-be developer to provide market evidence and/or independent 
valuation evidence with respect to the premium. In England and Wales this has recently been 
made easier by the disclosure of price information by the Land Registry; in Scotland such 
information has traditionally been in the public domain. The planning authority could, of 
course, challenge such evidence. It might be reasonable to measure the mean premium over, 
say, two years rather than rely on a signal of perhaps a purely temporary shortage of supply. 
Markets can change rapidly, especially given the constraints on supply that have been 
accumulating since 1947 with the consequent price volatility and probably an increasing role 
of expectations about future price movements. As is discussed below, however, thresholds 
could be set high enough to resolve this problem.  
 
The second problem would be to determine the value of the threshold, a premium greater 
than which would constitute a material consideration generating a presumption of permission 
being granted. There are arguments on the side both of setting thresholds to reflect local 
factors and ensuring they are set nationally. It is our judgement that thresholds should be set 
according to nationally determined criteria because if set locally there would most likely be 
attempts to manipulate the threshold value effectively to maintain the status quo. On the other 
hand – and perhaps politically helpful in getting the mechanism accepted – the threshold 
could be determined in part as a function of local housing affordability – and set according to 
national criteria although the level might vary as the relevant local indicators varied. Because 
of cyclical factors and short run volatility in the demand for land for different uses there is a 
reasonable argument for setting thresholds at a significant positive value in order not to 
trigger land release in response to purely temporary conditions. 
  
Bringing new land into urban use imposes significant infrastructure costs. It would seem 
appropriate that the would-be developer should pay these. The full costs of development, 
however, include not just the infrastructure costs relating to the site itself and connecting it to 
road systems and utilities but the full financial costs to the community at large including 
additional policing, education, regional transport infrastructure etc made necessary by the 
development. It is useful to think about these two types of costs separately as: 
  
1)  Infrastructure directly associated with bringing the site into use (internal transport, 
sewage etc plus costs of connecting these services to local networks); and 
2)  The wider financial costs to the community external to the site itself. 
 
11 The first set of costs – those of ‘internal infrastructure’ - is already paid in kind by the 
developer so that there is an incentive to develop sites where such costs are minimised. Such 
costs are capitalised and so reflected (negatively) in the price a developer will pay for a site. 
Internal infrastructure costs are determined both by the nature of the site (brownfield sites 
tend to be significantly more expensive to develop than greenfield ones) and the regulatory 
standards that are imposed by public authorities. The second set of costs – the 'Community 
costs' - should be charged as an Impact Fee, paid to the local authority
9.  
 
At present there is a very imperfect system to defray the second set of costs based on the idea 
of ‘planning gain’ and implemented through ‘Section 106 Agreements’ negotiated between 
the local authority and the developer
10. The aim is to negotiate some community benefit such 
as infrastructure, open space or affordable housing which the developer will pay for. These 
agreements have high transactions costs associated with them and are very imperfect. If 
changes to the planning system such as those proposed were implemented, the windfall gain 
from obtaining planning permission would be significantly eroded or eliminated, making it 
more difficult to obtain substantial gains from such agreements. Moreover, the outcome they 
produce depends on the skills of the negotiators and the particular circumstances of the parties 
involved, including current local political priorities and the news or political value of the 
agreements. Thus as well as being very imperfect in terms of outcomes, Section 106 
Agreements generate a significant barrier to entry for new developers. They generate 
economies of scale for developers. The larger developers are, the more expertise they acquire 
both in terms of knowledge allowing them to target Section 106 Agreements to the particular 
concerns of local authorities and in terms of their ability to negotiate outcomes favourable to 
the developer. 
 
Since the aim of the changes proposed here is to move in the direction of a more objective and 
transparent, common currency of decision making, it would seem far more appropriate to 
replace Section 106 agreements with a simple Impact Fee as is frequently used in the US. 
Apart from the advantage of transparency, Impact Fees would generate a useful income 
stream for local government independent of central government and related to their needs. In 
contrast to the US, however, where total revenues from impact fees must be related to the 
costs that are deemed to be imposed by the development, we would argue that such revenues 
should not be hypothecated. Partly this reflects the traditional hostility of British governments 
to hypothecated taxes and the complexities that would be involved; partly it reflects the reality 
of current Section 106 Agreements which can cover a wide range of presumed community 
                                                 
9 Note the proposal here is quite distinct from that for an Environmental Impact Fee in DETR (1999). The Urban 
Taskforce argued for such a fee to be added to existing land use controls. Since, however, land use planning is 
designed to safeguard amenities and is supposed to take into account social costs of development, such a fee 
added to existing controls would impose an undue burden on development in excess of its true social cost. In the 
context of the present proposal it makes far better sense to include these environmental costs of development 
explicitly in the estimation of the value of land in its present use. Thus if development of a particular parcel of 
land would impose environmental costs such, for example, as additional costs of global warming compared to 
present agricultural use, these should be included in estimating the social value of the land in its present use and 
therefore as a reason for maintaining a given level of price premium through a refusal of planning permission. A 
major purpose of the present proposal is to make such claims transparent so that the reasons for planning 
decisions are explicit and challengeable on the basis of the normal criteria used for resource allocation decisions 
in a market economy. Such a claim emphatically does not carry the implication that decisions made according to 
the price signals thrown up by markets are always socially optimal. In land markets this is seldom the case 
because of interdependencies of neighbouring land use and the importance of local public goods and amenities. 
Rather it is that unless there is a common yardstick, gross misallocation of resources and inefficiency can occur 
for negligible benefits. 
10 These have their counterpart in the US system of ‘exactions’ which are payments developers are obliged to 
make in exchange for being granted building permits or variances from existing zoning regulations. 
12 benefits; and partly it reflects the need to provide some incentive to Local Authorities to 
accept development. 
 
The Community costs of development vary from region to region depending on the extent to 
which there is spare capacity in existing transport networks, school systems etc. For 
residential development in southeast England total development costs (i.e. both type 1 and 2) 
were reported to be perhaps £400 000 to £500 000 per acre in 2003 but more precise estimates 
would obviously be necessary. Like the value of thresholds, the level of Impact Fees should 
not be a matter of local discretion since if it were their value could be manipulated to prevent 
any development. Since the community costs of development, however, vary from place to 
place, they should be determined on the basis of nationally set formula designed to reflect the 
differential costs of new development in differing regional and environmental contexts.  
  
As an example of how this proposal might work in practice an owner or developer could 
apply for permission for residential development on a site on the edge of Reading presently in 
agricultural use. For simplicity we will base everything on prices ruling in about 2000 when 
the market price of agricultural land at the urban fringe was some £2,500 per acre and the 
price of residential land was at least £2 million per acre (see the values for Shinfield in Table 
3 or the reported price of land on the Wokingham/Bracknell border in 2003). If the full 
development costs were transferred to the developer then the combined value of both the 
direct site-related infrastructure and the wider community costs might be, say, £500 000 with 
£200 000 representing the site costs (the internal infrastructure costs which, since they are met 
by the developer in the present system, one must add to the observed price of land and in 
calculating premiums could be ignored) and £300 000 representing the community costs. US 
research (see, for example, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004) shows that Impact Fees are 
fully capitalised in the price developers pay for land. Since developers are already paying for 
the site-related costs, imposing an Impact Fee of £300 000 per acre could, therefore, be 
assumed to reduce the market price of land to £1.7m in the example being considered, 
although strictly there is the issue of any expected costs of Section 106 Agreements that might 
be capitalised into land prices in the present system. We ignore this but its effect would be 
similar to that of the internal infrastructure costs of the site paid by the developer – the 
expected value of Section 106 Agreements will be deducted from what developers would pay 
for land.  
 
Table 4: Illustrative Calculations for Reading Housing Market at Prices Current in 2000 
    Cost per acre £ 
1  Price of agricultural land  2 500 
2  On site (internal) infrastructure costs  200 000 
3  Community costs of development   300 000 
4 Threshold  200  000 
  Sub total  702 500 
5  Price of housing land plus internal infrastructure costs  2 200 000 
6  Effective Premium*  1 497 500 
*Calculated as Market price of housing land including costs paid by developer less items 1, 2, 
3 & 4. Since of course item 2 appears as both a cost and, in 5, for practical purposes it should 
be ignored and there would be no need to estimate it. 
 
One could reasonably argue, therefore, that the appropriate threshold should be zero if an 
Impact Fee is imposed. Since, however, as was noted above, there are substantial short run 
changes in land prices (for each use) and perhaps other uncertainties, then one might argue 
that one should select a conservative threshold i.e. one that did not trigger development in 
13 response to short run cyclical changes in the market. In that case the threshold might be set at, 
say, £200 000 per acre. In the example being considered, therefore, there would be a 
presumption of permission for development unless the full amenity and environmental value 
associated with the land in its current agricultural use could be shown to be equal to or exceed 
£1 497 500 per acre. These illustrative calculations are set out in Table 4. 
 
Similarly, to take the situation as it was reported in 2003, if the differential between the 
market price of housing and industrial land at that location exceeded £200 000 (there would 
still be a case for the threshold to prevent decisions being made on the basis of just short term 
supply differences) there would be a presumption that the land on the southeastern border of 
the urban area worth £3 million per acre for residential development, could be developed for 
residential purposes. Since it was already designated for urban development, it could be 
presumed that there were no 'amenity/environmental benefits' associated with its current 
designation and that all the expected economic value associated with developing it for 
industry would already be reflected in its market price for industrial development. The 
appropriate impact fee for residential development may not necessarily equal that for 
industrial development, but it is not obvious a priori, which would be greater. While 
residential development might be expected to impose greater costs for school building, 
industrial development might impose greater costs for police and fire protection or traffic 
congestion. For this example we assume the appropriate impact fee per acre developed would 
remain unchanged.  
 
This brings us to the third practical problem that would need to be solved: how amenity 
benefits could be estimated if the planning authority sought to object to the presumption of 
development. It is almost certain that such cases would arise, especially in the period 
immediately following the implementation of a system such as that proposed here. Where 
amenity benefits of open land accrue to local house owners then quite standard hedonic 
analysis can provide reasonable and defensible estimates of their value per acre. The great 
majority of non-urban land is in intensive agricultural use and provides low levels of such 
benefit (see, for example, Barker 2003). The values in Table 5 are per hectare not per acre and 
suggest the amenity value of intensive agricultural land is negligible and could therefore 
seldom be successfully cited as a public amenity defence for refusing development 
permission. They further suggest that public space in the urban core, such as parks or 
recreation areas, have the highest amenity value and so should generally be preserved from 
development. Clearly there are practical and intellectual problems in putting precise figures 
on the amenity and environmental value of land in any given use. The introduction of such a 
system, however, would immediately generate substantial incentives to devise and test 
credible methodologies. Moreover given existing research such as that summarised in Table 5 
or Irwin (2002) on the value of intensively farmed agricultural land it does not seem likely 
that any credible methodology would give estimates of value in current use for such land 
remotely approaching its value for housing. This would very quickly lead to a very substantial 
increase in the supply of housing land. 
  
The likely result of implementing a change along the lines proposed would be that as the use 
of the new price information became established within the planning decision making process, 
new applications for development would be concentrated in locations in which permission 
would be virtually assured – i.e. on land currently in intensive agricultural use but with lower 
infrastructure costs; or land already designated for urban use but not for residential use. If this 
became the norm across the UK then not only would there be a rapid expansion of land supply 
for residential development but there would be a permanent change in expectations about 
future market values of land. Given the price volatility and very substantial long run real 
14 increase in developable land values the supply restrictions imposed since 1947 have 
generated, it is likely that expectations about future price movements have become influential 
drivers of behaviour for agents operating in the land market. So it seems plausible that a 
change such as that contemplated here would quite quickly substantially reduce the very large 
premiums now observed.  
 
Table 5:  Some recent estimates of values of non-urban land 
 
 
  Present value per ha 









54,000 10,800,000  1,800,000 
Urban Fringe 
(Greenbelt) 










6,626 1,325,200  220,800 
Agricultural 
land (extensive) 
Recreation, landscape, cultural 
heritage, ecology 
3,150 630,000  105,000 
Agricultural 
land (intensive) 




Recreation, landscape, ecology, 
hydrology 
6,616 1,323,200  220,500 
 
Source: Adapted from Barker (2003) Table 1.6 and derived from ODPM (2002) Appraisal 
Guidance, Valuing the External Benefits of Undeveloped Land – a Review of the Economic 
Literature 
 
There are National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) and other areas 
with specific protection (such as Sites of Special Scientific Interest) in regions of high 
demand. The full social value of such areas is unlikely to be capitalised into the housing 
market because of the extent to which they attract visitors from beyond the local area. In 
addition there is likely to be option and existence demand for such land that produces benefits 
to society as a whole rather than to those located nearby. This may also be true of the values 
of beautiful views although the evidence does suggest the value of views can get capitalised 
into land and house prices, as does immediate access to a major natural amenity, so sites in 
such protected areas command a substantial premium. As a result, owners of land in or near 
such sites might well try for permission to develop. It would probably be administratively and 
politically easiest to simply deem that amenity values in all such existing specially protected 
areas were sufficient to constitute a public interest reason for refusing development.  
 
The exceptions might be Greenbelts and AONBs. They cover large areas of high demand 
regions and their boundaries have been determined within the logic of the existing Planning 
System. A major feature of this has been - as noted above - to define ‘urban envelopes’ 
beyond which development is not to be permitted. As a result, the boundaries of Greenbelts 
and AONBs have tended automatically to coincide with the existing urban envelope 
15 boundaries even though some of the land adjoining the envelope boundary may have only a 
low amenity and environmental value. Indeed to the extent that such areas are in intensive 
agriculture and are close to centres of employment the sort of consideration raised in the 
DETR (1999) are likely to have less force there than in more remote agricultural areas. Much 
land presently designated as Greenbelt or AONB on the urban fringe often has no particular 
rights of access and is in intensive agricultural use. In the case of such land, therefore, despite 
its present designation, it might make sense to apply the test of amenity value in current use. 
Its development would impose low costs on the community as a whole even though, of 
course, it would reduce the asset values of particular house owners in so far as those asset 
values represented the capitalised value of proximity to agricultural land. 
 
If designated areas (or at least National Parks and a limited set of other designations 
representing the greatest value to the community) were automatically deemed to generate 
sufficient amenity value to justify any premium, no matter what that might be, then there 
would almost certainly be pressure for the designated protection of additional land. It would 
seem appropriate to make the extension of such specially protected areas, therefore, 
conditional on showing that the amenity and environmental values per acre exceeded the 
effective price premiums.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Over time controlling land supply by fiat has generated price distortions on a par with those 
observed in Soviet bloc countries during the 1970 and 1980s. There is a serious and growing 
problem of land supply in Britain – most obviously for residential development in regions of 
high demand
11. The constraints on land supply (more exactly the supply of space for 
residential use) have over time fed through to an increasingly inelastic supply of housing. 
This chiefly arises from the combined effect of there being a highly income elastic demand 
for housing and garden space (rather than for units of housing) together with a system of land 
use planning the major aim of which is to constrain space consumption irrespective of any 
price effects this may have. 
 
Not only has this caused the real price of housing and housing land to rise substantially over 
the past 50 years but it has caused accelerating price volatility and very substantial price 
discontinuities for parcels of land that, while they are contiguous, are designated by the 
planning system for different uses. 
 
These price premiums provide direct information on the shortage of land in any locality for 
any particular use. Such price premiums should therefore be introduced as a material 
consideration in the planning decision making process with a presumption that, if they exceed 
some predetermined threshold, permission to develop will be granted unless the amenity 
values generated by the land in its current use are sufficient to show that it is in the public 
interest to maintain the existing use and refuse development. Given existing knowledge of 
such amenity values it seems most unlikely that such an argument could be sustained in the 
case of intensively farmed agricultural land. If Impact Fees were introduced then there would 
                                                 
11 Space constraints in other uses should not be ignored and may have significant cost and economic 
implications. For example, a recent study by Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) concluded that for comparable cities, the 
total occupation costs of office space in the UK were about twice those in other major EU countries. King Sturge 
(2004) estimate that total occupation costs for office space are substantially greater per square metre in 
Birmingham, Glasgow or Manchester than they are in New York, and are almost twice the level they are in 
Singapore (where land supply might be thought to be truly constrained). The most expensive location in the 
world for industrial space was estimated to be west of London where it was more than 60 percent more 
expensive than in Frankfurt and more than three times the price per square metre than in Chicago. 
16 be an argument that the acceptable threshold above which a premium would trigger a 
presumption of development should be set at zero although because of short run price 
fluctuations and uncertainties it would probably be more appropriate to maintain a threshold 
significantly greater than zero. 
 
There would be serious disadvantages if land supply was allocated by the unregulated 
operation of the price mechanism because of the problems of market failure already noted. 
There are various ways in which the damaging effects of the types of market failure 
characteristic of land markets can be reduced and regulation – or planning – is one of them. 
On the other hand, except in the extreme circumstances of general mobilisation during war, 
the damaging effects of price distortions caused by regulation are rarely, if ever, improved by 
further regulation. In the housing field, the problems resulting from rent controls are an 
example of a case where further regulation failed. The solution, however, has not been total 
deregulation of housing markets but a degree of de-regulation and finding ways of introducing 
the valuable information contained in prices. While there are practical problems associated 
with introducing price signals into planning decision-making and there would certainly be 
political ones, there are no disadvantages in principle, provided that the market failures 
planning was designed to compensate for continue to be recognised. The proposals we have 
outlined in this paper are designed to do just that  
 
One of the advantages of introducing price signals into the planning decision making process 
is that it would achieve a similar degree of relaxation more or less everywhere, as indicated by 
the patterns of price premiums observed. This would tend to equalise regional house prices 
over the long term and so allow greater labour mobility. The constraint on land supply and so 
house prices bite sharpest in regions of high demand. This increases regional house price 
differentials and makes it harder for workers in less prosperous regions to move to where job 
prospects are better. This is particularly true for poorer workers in social housing.  The 
proposal would, therefore, help resolve the so called North-South divide, help resolve 
problems of the supply of so-called key workers and housing affordability in regions of high 
demand and create greater labour market flexibility.  
 
The proposal would also have the considerable political merit of introducing a transparent, 
quasi-objective and so politically defensible mechanism into decisions about land supply. It 
would have parallels with making the Bank of England independent. It would help to distance 
land availability decisions from the political process. Clearly there would be political 
difficulties in introducing a reform as radical as that proposed here. Partly that is a problem of 
imagination: we are simply used to the system we have. But also there would be significant 
redistributative effects and people would seek to defend the value of their assets whether 
expensive space or the capitalised value of planning generated amenity benefits such as 
proximity to agricultural land. However space is enormously expensive because the planning 
system has been controlling its supply independently of its price and that is what underlies the 
problem of housing supply in the UK; and, as was shown in Cheshire and Sheppard (2002), 
the amenity benefits – especially that which would be most affected, proximity to unbuilt land 
– are particularly regressive in their distribution: they are distributed even more inequitably 
than incomes of owner occupiers. So reforms along the lines proposed would both improve 
the operation of the housing market and in the long run have a progressive impact on the 
distribution of welfare across households. 
 
There would have been few observers who in 1992 would have predicted the Bank of England 
would be independent 5 years later. Making the planning system responsive to price signals 
and less arbitrary in its impact on land supply may seem problematic. But doing nothing is in 
17 the long run even more problematic. House prices may not collapse from the 2004 boom; but 
they may. We do know that if land supply does not become more responsive to underlying 
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